The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - The Tragedy of Mission 51-L in 1986 - Volume Three, Appendix O, Search, Recovery and Reconstruction Report
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), World Spaceflight News, Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Rogers Commission
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Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
June 6th, 1986
Washington, D.C.
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IN MEMORIAM
"The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle against all odds. We learned again that this America, which Abraham Lincoln called the last, best hope of man on Earth, was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men and women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more than was expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly reward."
President Ronald Reagan * January 31, 1986
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Francis R. (Dick) Scobee - Commander
Michael John Smith - Pilot
Ellison S. Onizuka - Mission Specialist One
Judith Arlene Resnik - Mission Specialist Two
Ronald Erwin McNair - Mission Specialist Three
S. Christa McAuliffe - Payload Specialist One
Gregory Bruce Jarvis - Payload Specialist Two
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Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - Volume 3
NASA Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction Task Force Report and Enclosures
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CONTENTS
I. Introduction
At 11:38:00.010 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on January 28, 1986, Mission 51-L Shuttle was launched from Launch Complex (LC) 39B at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida, with seven astronauts aboard. As observed and recorded on video tape at 74.130 seconds after liftoff, the Shuttle was engulfed in flames. It began a catastrophic breakup. Both Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) separated from the External Tank (ET) and continued powered flight on erratic courses until the Range Command Destruct signal was sent by the Range Safety Officer (RSO) at 11:39:50.2. Numerous large pieces of the Orbiter, "Challenger," and the ET were observed to descend from the point of initial breakup and fall into the Atlantic Ocean east-northeast of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). After Command Destruct action, the SRB's started to break into many pieces and fall into the ocean east of the Orbiter and ET impact area.
The Air Force Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESMC) was tasked by the Program Requirement Document (PRD) to provide both radar and optical tracking for Mission 51-L launch. This tasking is provided for all Space Transportation System (STS) launches in order to provide data for the performance of the Range Safety function and also to provide engineering and trajectory data to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The status of these systems was briefed at the Commander's Mission Briefing (see DDATF Pre-Launch Activities Team Report, Appendix J, Appendix 6) and the NASA Launch Readiness Review on January 14, 1986 (see Appendix F). The radar and optical data was used by the RSO to verify the vehicle had experienced a catastrophic breakup and both SRB's were still propulsive following the initial breakup at T+ 74 seconds. This data also provides the basis for water impact predictions used in the initial stages of surface recovery. The lack of a multi-object tracking system made the prediction of radar and optical data extremely difficult and, to a large measure, accounted for the lengthy search and recovery operations.
The Department of Defense Manager's STS Contingency Support Operations Center initiated a search and rescue operation on behalf of NASA. The surface search was directed by the Launch Recovery Director (LRD), in accordance with the STS Contingency Support Operations Plan dated 1 December 1985 (see Appendix G), and the Department of Defense Manager for Space Shuttle Contingency Support (DDMS). The surface search was coordinated by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with assistance from ESMC. The surface search was terminated on February 7, 1986. The Department of the Navy was also requested to initiate preparation for an underwater salvage operation.
NASA established three areas for storage and reconstruction. The Logistics Building and an adjacent area on KSC were used for Orbiter and ET debris, respectively, and on Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Hangar "O" and the EOD Range were used for SRB debris.
On January 28, 1986, Dr. William Graham, NASA Acting Administrator, appointed Mr. Jesse Moore to act as the interim 51-L Mishap Investigation Board chairman. Mr. Moore requested that Col. Edward O'Connor direct the activity of the NASA LRD and coordinate the development of the necessary search and recovery organizations required to support the recovery of the 51-L flight crew and those flight components that would provide the basis for the accident investigation. Col. O'Connor also directed the development of the recovered components preservation plan and requested Mr. Terry Armentrout of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to establish a Structural Reconstruction and Evaluation Group composed of engineering representatives from the STS element contractors, NASA, and the NTSB. Col. O'Connor provided continuing direction to these activities until formally chartered as Team Lead for the Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction Team of the Task Force on March 20, 1986.
Initial priorities for the underwater salvage operations were as follows:
1. Right-Hand Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)
2. Left-Hand SRB
3. Orbiter Crew Compartment
4. Payload
The recovery of Mission 51-L Shuttle components for support of the accident investigation activities of the Task Force was terminated on May 1, 1986. The deep water SRB recovery was terminated after the recovery of Contacts #131 and #712 which contain approximately 90% of the burn-through area of the right-hand aft field joint. This is believed to be the origin of the initial failure. Shallow water recovery was deemed to have provided sufficient material to confirm that the right-hand SRB failure was the initiating failure mode and that all other flight components failed subsequent to this failure.
Some shallow water recovery will continue in order to provide material for NASA Design Centers' Material Properties Studies.
The following pages provide a narrative of the activities leading to the recovery of debris as well as the structural reconfiguration and evaluation. The detailed source data for this report are in Enclosures 1 through 9.
Remarks:
This report utilizes the manufacturer's coordinate system. This system was selected because the reconstruction process required use of the manufacturer's drawings. Reference Figures 0 and 0-1 for the axes and coordinates.
The Photo and TV Support Team utilized the Flight Dynamics coordinate system which is illustrated in Volume 1 of their report.
II. Directive Appointing Team/Charter
III. Organizational Structure Technique
A. Organization
The following two charts show the top levels of the organization as charted by Rear Admiral Richard Truly and does not represent the multitude of people that participated in the Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction Task.
B. Methods of Investigation
Immediately following the mishap, the NASA LRD requested that the NASA SRB retrieval vessels proceed to the water impact location and also requested that DDMS dispatch all immediately available surface vessels and aircraft to the area of the mishap. The ESMC RSO held all aircraft and surface vessels outside of the falling debris area until entry was deemed to be safe from falling materials that could cause a hazard to the crews entering the area. Approximately one hour after the mishap, a sur- • face search was initiated in the immediate area surrounding the water impact location of the Orbiter and ET. A large amount of Orbiter and ET debris was found floating and was recovered by surface ships. Due to the currents of the Gulf Stream, the surface search was expanded to the north and, over the next several days, extended to an area 450 nautical miles north of the initial search area.
Radar tracking data from the ESMC was utilized to determine the area for the underwater search and sonar mapping of this area commenced. The search area was subsequently expanded based on further data reduction efforts that identified a wider dispersion of Right SRB components following the Command Destruct.
Identification of individual sonar contacts was accomplished by remotely-operated vehicles (ROVs) and manned submersibles in both shallow water and deep water areas as well as divers in shallow (less than 200 ft. (61 meters)) water. This identification established the debris to be recovered as well as the priorities of recovery. Plans were developed for the recovery technique, saf-ing, and preservation of the components.
The recovery was accomplished by the divers and submersibles. The recovered parts were delivered to impound areas for possible reconstruction.
The Orbiter, ET, SRB's, and cargo (payloads) were placed in separate areas for reconstruction. The reconstruction placed the components in as close a proximity to the original configuration as possible. The debris was photographed and examined for physical evidence and samples were then taken for laboratory examination.
The analyses of the recovered components conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were used to verify the conclusions of the Accident Analysis Team in determining the specific failure modes/scenarios dispositions (probable, improbable, and possible).
At the time of writing this report, the identification, recovery and reconstruction tasks are still in progress.
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IV. Definition of Terms and Acronyms
ACO Aircraft Control Officer
AFB Air Force Base
AFRPL Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory
AOS Acquisition of Signal
AP Ammonium Perchlorate
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ARS Auxiliary Rescue and Salvage
ARTC Air Route Traffic Control
ASE Airborne Support Equipment
ASR Auxiliary Submarine Rescue
BET Best Estimate of Trajectory
BRD Booster Recovery Director
BSM Booster Separation Motors
CASP Computer Assisted Search Program
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
CDF Confined Detonating Fuse
CEP Circular Error Probability
cg Center of gravity
CG Coast Guard
CGC Coast Guard Cutter
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CW Continuous Wave
dBsm Decibels relative to one square meter
DDMS Department of Defense Manager STS Contingency Support Operations
DDT Deflagration-Detonation Transition
DEG Degree
DOD Department of Defense
DPDE Data Playback and Digitizing Equipment (video)
E&I Electrical and Instrumentation
EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESMC Eastern Space and Missile Center
EST Eastern Standard Time
ET External Tank
ETA External Tank Attach
ETR Eastern Test Range
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FDIR Fault Detection, Isolation, Recovery
fps Feet per second
fps Frames per second
FRSI Felt Reusable Surface Insulation
FSW Feet Salt Water
FTD Foreign Technology Division
GH2 Gaseous Hydrogen
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPS Global Positioning System
GO2 Gaseous Oxygen
HAZ Heat Affected Zone
HP Hewlett Packard
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
HQS Headquarters
I/T Intertank
IEA Integrated Electronics Assembly
IFLOT Intermediate Focal Length Optical Recorder
IGOR Intercept Ground Optical Recorder
ISL Inter Surface Line
IUS Inertial Upper Stage
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSC Johnson Space Center
JSL Johnson Sea Link
KNOTS Nautical miles per hour
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LAT Latitude
lbs Pounds
LC Launch Complex
LCD Launch Countdown
LCU Landing Craft Utility
LH Left Hand
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen
LO2 Liquid Oxygen
LONG Longitude
LORAN Long Range Navigation
LORAC Long Range Accuracy
LOS Loss of Signal
LOV Loss of Visibility
LPS Launch Processing System
LRD Launch Recovery Director
LRD Landing Recovery Director
LSC Linear-Shaped Charge
LSO Launch Services Organization
LWT Light Weight Tank
m/s Meters per second
M/V Motor Vessel
MARISAT Marine Satellite Communications System
MCBR Mobile C-Band Radar
MDM Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
MIGOR Mobile Intercept Ground Optical Recorder
MOM Marine Operations Manager
MPS Main Propulsion System
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NITE N-Internal Trajectory Estimation Program
nm Nautical mile
NMCC National Military Command Center
NR-1 Navy Research Submarine
NS Nuclear Shuttle
NSI NASA Standard Initiator
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OMI Operations Maintenance Instructions
OMS Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
OPCONCEN Operations Control Center
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSL Outer Surface Line
OV Orbiter Vehicle
P/L Payload
PAL Protuberance Aerodynamic Load
PAN AM Pan American Airlines
PBAN Polybutadiene Acrylonitrile
PDL MIGOR Ponce de Leon Metric Intercept Ground Optical Recorder
PDV Peak Detected Video
PIC Pyro Initiator Circuit
PRF Pulse Recurrence Frequency
R/V Research Vehicle
RADM Rear Admiral
RAE Range/Azimuth/Elevation
RAPP Radar Position Program (Computer Program 331)
RAPS Right Aft Propulsion System
RCA Radio Corporation of America
RCS Radar Cross Section
RCS Reaction Control System
RF Radio Frequency
RGA Rate Gyro Assembly
RH Right Hand
ROM Rough Order of Magnitude
ROTI Recording Optical Tracking Instrument
ROV Remote Operating Vehicle
RSB Rudder Speed Brake
RSO Range Safety Officer
RSS Range Safety System
RTI Range/Time/Intensity (video)
S/N Serial Number
S/N Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SAR Search and Rescue
SARTEL Search and Rescue Telephone Network
SEM Scanning Electron Microscope
SITREPS Situation Reports
SLA Sprayable Light Ablator
SOC Support Operations Center
SOG Speed Over Ground
SONAT Southern Natural Coast Oil Company
SPC Shuttle Processing Contract
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SRO Supervisor Range Operations
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SRR Search, Recovery and Reconstruction
STA Station
STS Space Transportation System
SUPSALV Supervisor of Salvage (USN)
TCAR Tracking Camera Automatic Reduction (Computer Program 017)
TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
TPS Thermal Protection System (SRB, ET, or Orbiter)
TV Television
TVC Thrust Vector Control
UCS Universal Camera Site
UHF Ultra High Frequency
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USCG United States Coast Guard
USCGC United States Coast Guard Cutter
USN United States Navy
USS United States Ship
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base
VHF Very High Frequency
WGS World Geodetic System
WSMC Western Space and Missile Center
x Power of magnification
B. Definition of Terms
Fish Towed Sonar Cylindrical Tube (sensor)
Pinger Homing Device (Short-range acoustic transmitter)
Starboard Right Side
Tracor U.S. Navy Contractor
WD-40 Brand name of product for corrosion protection
Zulu Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
V. Report Summaries
A. Surface Search
During the first few minutes following the Mission 51-L Shuttle Mishap, the DOD Manager's STS Contingency Support Operations Center (SOC) alerted appropriate search and rescue operations and established communications with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS formed a Shuttle Response Cell which was briefed on the situation.
During the first fifteen (15) minutes following the mishap, search and rescue aircraft and ships were dispatched to holding points short of the safety zone established for falling debris. During this period, one aircraft reported sightings of falling debris impacting the ocean surface. The two SRB retrieval vessels, Liberty Star and Freedom Star, were directed from launch support positions to the impact area.
At 1737Z (1237 EST), the Range Safety Officer gave a clearance for aircraft to enter the safety area.
By 2130Z (1630 EST), a major Search and Rescue (SAR) effort was requested. By 2400Z (1900 EST), twelve (12) aircraft and eight (8) ships were participating in the area of debris impact.
On February 5, 1986, the Coast Guard sent a notice to mariners declaring the search area a safety area, which suspended all fishing operations in the area. This was done because numerous scallop boats reported finding Shuttle debris in their nets.
The Surface Search and Rescue effort continued until February 7, 1986. Debris recovered by the ships assigned to the effort was brought into Port Canaveral and off-loaded. Debris found off the coast of Georgia and South Carolina was returned to the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS).
During the period of January 28, 1986 through February 7, 1986, the Search and Rescue Operation was simultaneously supported with as many as 14 ships and 11 aircraft. The Coast Guard stated, "The operation was the largest surface search in which they had participated."
B. Metric Data (Radar and Optics)
The source materials for this section were two Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESMC) reports, "Radar Data Analysis and Impact Estimation for STS 51-L Debris," Report No. 82-SR-86-06, dated 7 March 1986, Enclosure 2, and "STS 51-L Right SRB," Report 82-SR-86-07, dated 4 April 1986, Enclosure 3.
The prime purpose of evaluation of the metric data (radar/optics) was to provide impact locations for debris recovery and, when possible, identify the tracked object.
Following the breakup of the External Tank (ET) at T+ 74 seconds, the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) continued under thrust for approximately 37 seconds. It was tracked continuously by Radar 1.17 and the Ponce de Leon Metric Integrated Ground Optical Recorder (PDL MIGOR). Radar 0.14 and the Universal Camera Site (UCS) #15 Intermediate Focal Length Optical Tracker (IFLOT) tracked briefly.
Figure 1 shows the geographical locations of the radar and optical stations as well as the track of the right SRB Aft skirt with a short section of SRB segment and impact points of other SRB debris.
Analysis of the PDL MIGOR video tape shows the right-hand SRB, following the ET breakup, to be rolling clockwise viewed from aft approximately once every 10 seconds. Possibly this period decreased by about 1.5 seconds during the 37 seconds of powered flight indicating an angular acceleration about the longitudinal axis.
From T+93.6 to T+95.8 seconds, Radar 0.14 detected a number of small objects separating from the main target. None of these objects was visible to the optics sites or on the radar boresight video tape. Enough data could be extracted to permit a trajectory estimate to be made for one of these objects, designated RD on Figure 1. Impact was at approximately T+398 seconds, and the separation speed relative to the main SRB body was on the order of 60 meters per second (m/s).
At T+110.3 seconds, Range Safety issued a command destruct to the SRB's. The shock wave from the destruct explosion of the right SRB was visible on the UCS-15 E-705 16mm camera, permitting a computed estimate of the explosion at time T+ 110.275 seconds. The propagation speed of the shock wave was on the order of 1,000 m/s during the first few hundredths of a second with the expansion slowing to essentially zero within 0.1 second.
Following the command destruct, the SRB separated into a number of fragments. Optical resolution was not sufficient to permit the identification of these fragments. Radar 1.17 and PDL MIGOR continued to track a large piece later identified as part of the aft segment and skirt. A number of smoke trails, possibly two dozen small (pinpoint) glowing objects and four bright glowing objects, could be seen on the UCS-15 IFLOT 70mm film. The four bright glowing objects and possibly three smoke trails were also seen on the PDL MIGOR video tape. The radar boresight video tape showed no visible object after the command destruct.
Because the smoke trails are at the limit of the PDL MIGOR video resolution, first priority was given to the three bright glowing objects not tracked by Radar 1.17. Triangulation on these objects (RA, RB, and RC) was possible for periods of four (4) to six (6) seconds, and impact trajectories have been generated. Figure 1 is a map showing the ground traces of the tracked (solid) and projected (dotted) trajectories. Separation speeds relative to the booster aft segment ranged from 45 m/s to 120 m/s.
From T+ 115 to T+ 141 seconds, an object flashing twice per second was in the PDL MIGOR field of view. Although it appears near the tracked segment, it cannot be positively linked to the right SRB.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar observations cannot be positively associated with the right or the left SRB. The six impact estimates may be from either source, but Objects 2, 5, 6, and 7 appeared more likely to be from the right SRB.
Estimated impact locations of nine objects were determined using the ESMC radar data only. The impact locations are shown on Figure 2.
1. Object A's impact location was of prime importance as it represented debris from the right SRB.
2. Two objects (F and G) were parachutes believed to have been picked up during the surface search. Note: One drogue chute was recovered during the surface search. The right-hand main chutes were recovered with the right-hand SRB forward skirt.
3. Two objects (B and D) were believed to be sizeable (2 to 5 meters, 6 to 16 feet) based on radar boresight recordings and were believed to be dense based on their early impact times.
4. One object (K) was relatively dense but the cross-section was less than 0.1 square meter (1.1 square feet).
5. Two objects (C and I) had moderately slow final descent rates of about 134 feet per second (41 meters per second) with Object C having a relatively large cross-section.
6. Object H was of little interest for recovery operations since it appeared to be a small, light object which may very well have floated after impact.
Both of the reports estimated impact locations of Shuttle-related debris thought to be from the SRB's. Data from both reports support the impact location of the right SRB aft skirt with partial segment attached, reference Figure 2, Object "A" and Figure 1, Point "R".
C. Sonar Mapping
1. The Supervisor of Salvage, Charles A. Bartholomew, Captain, U.S. Navy, with the assistance of the SRB Incremental Recovery Group lead by Alexander A. McCool, Director, Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC, directed the Search and Recovery Operation. This section and the next two sections describe the methods utilized during this operation. A more detailed description is contained in Enclosure 4, Search, Classification, and Recovery, and Enclosure 5, SRB Incremental Recovery Planning.
The planning for an underwater salvage operation is dependent upon a changing set of contact data, priorities, and environmental conditions. By utilizing the data available, the proper assets were acquired and effectively utilized (see Table 1 for assets used). The search, contact classification, and recovery phases were accomplished concurrently.