The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - The Tragedy of Mission 51-L in 1986 - Volume Three, Appendix N, Photo and TV Support Team Report
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), World Spaceflight News, Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Rogers Commission
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Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
June 6th, 1986
Washington, D.C.
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IN MEMORIAM
"The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle against all odds. We learned again that this America, which Abraham Lincoln called the last, best hope of man on Earth, was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men and women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more than was expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly reward."
President Ronald Reagan * January 31, 1986
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Francis R. (Dick) Scobee - Commander
Michael John Smith - Pilot
Ellison S. Onizuka - Mission Specialist One
Judith Arlene Resnik - Mission Specialist Two
Ronald Erwin McNair - Mission Specialist Three
S. Christa McAuliffe - Payload Specialist One
Gregory Bruce Jarvis - Payload Specialist Two
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Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - Volume 3
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Volume 3: Appendix N - NASA Photo and TV Support Team Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Photo and TV Support Team was established to analyze and document STS 51-L photography and video products. Results were made available to the Failure Analysis Team for use in evaluating failure scenarios. The Photo Team consisted of subteams at Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) that represented the imagery working elements of those Centers and included an independent team leader and a deputy.
The results of the Photo and TV Support Team activities are documented in this comprehensive report, the core of which is the STS 51-L Incident Integrated Events Timeline developed by the team to correlate imagery and telemetry events. This report describes the significant observed anomalies and related events of the STS 51-L accident and includes image enhancement results which were used to identify, locate, and determine time-related characteristics of the events. Conclusions and findings for follow-up efforts are included. A video tape showing significant events was prepared as in interim report. An updated tape is planned which will reflect the final results and will include voice annotation and pictures of selected recovered hardware.
The KSC photographic and TV system consists of 108 film and 69 TV cameras. For this investigation, approximately 13 million frames of imagery were evaluated, including films from previous flights. Additionally, films from private citizens and news media were made available to the team; this help was very much appreciated and letters of appreciation were sent to the contributors.
Although only a few of the events which were analyzed proved to be significant to the investigation, the analysis of the events was vital in establishing the cause of the STS 51-L incident. The primary anomalous events seen in the imagery are the early smoke and later flame issuing from the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). All other anomalous events are the result of the failure indicated by these primary events.
Analysis of the smoke at lift-off was a combination of establishing the probable location, duration and dynamic characteristics of the smoke source. The source was determined to be at or near the aft field joint of the right SRB and circumferentially at approximately 300. This location was inferred geometrically from multiple camera locations since the source was not in the field of view of any camera. Image analysis also established that smoke first appeared at 0.678-second mission elapsed time (MET) and was last visible at 3.375 seconds MET. Frequency of the individual puffs was established (3 to 5 Hz) for comparison with overall vehicle dynamics.
There is no further evidence of the leak until 58.762 seconds MET, when an initially flickering, then steady flame was observed emanating from the right SRB. Photo analysis established its location to be the aft field joint in approximately the same location as the earlier smoke. Flicker frequency was determined to be approximately 10 Hz. (Note: Recovered right SRB hardware shows a burn through at this joint extending from 294° to 316°.)
Dimensions of the leak plume were estimated from the films and were used to support wind tunnel tests to characterize vehicle aerodynamics. Results of these tests were useful for trajectory reconstruction and also helped to explain the observed plume recirculation patterns.
Film analysis also determined the location of the impingement of the SRB leak plume on the External Tank (ET) and the effect of the plume of the resulting liquid hydrogen (LH2) leak. Film analysis showed the aft end of the right SRB separating from the ET. Geometric analysis of this motion indicates contact of the forward end of the right SRB and the ET intertank area. Finally, details of vehicle breakup and post-breakup characterization of the right SRB were determined. Since telemetry ceased at approximately 73 seconds, imagery and recovered hardware constituted the only evidence of the final destruction of the vehicle.
The activities of the team included analysis of closeout photography of the aft field joint where an initial review had indicated a possible O-ring flaw. Enhancement and mensuration of the film explained the observations and eliminated the concern of an O-ring flaw prior to mating.
In addition to these conclusions and findings, several important lessons were learned during this investigation. The imagery collected as a result of the clear-day weather was very significant in the accident analysis efforts. Had it been a night launch or a launch with an overcast sky, the amount of time required to reach the conclusions drawn would have been much greater and perhaps never as clearly: understood. Therefore, launch visibility for photographic reasons should be a primary mission rule until the hardware fixes resulting from this investigation are proved operational.
There is a need for better intercenter and intracenter organization of the photo and TV analysis to support both normal launches and contingency operations. Additionally, camera failures on launch day prevented a clear view of the hardware failure point. More and better cameras are required. Additionally, a review of the types of film used to better aid photo enhancement activities is required. A total review of the requirements for imagery and analysis methodology with a goal of improving imagery acquisition, processing, analysis, and archiving is required.
There is a requirement for the Space Transportation System (STS) program to charter an intercenter photographic/TV working group to document the activities required to implement the findings and conclusions of this report.
II. APPOINTMENT/TEAM CHARTER.
The following letter and its attachment establish the Photography and Television Support Team and appoint the Team Lead.
March 20, 1986
51-L DATA AND DESIGN ANALYSIS TASK FORCE
TO: D. Germany
FROM: Task Force Chairman
SUBJECT: Appointment of Lead, Photo and TV Support Team