The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980 - Unique Insights into Biological and Life Science Research from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo through Skylab (NASA SP-4213)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), World Spaceflight News, John A. Pitts
Smashwords Edition
Copyright 2012 Progressive Management
Questions? Suggestions? Comments? Concerns? Please contact the publisher directly at
Remember, the book retailer can't answer your questions, but we can!
* * * * * * * * * * *
Smashwords Edition, License Notes
This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This ebook may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each person you share it with. If you're reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then you should return to Smashwords.com and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
This is a privately authored news service and educational publication of Progressive Management. Our publications synthesize official government information with original material - they are not produced by the federal government. They are designed to provide a convenient user-friendly reference work to uniformly present authoritative knowledge that can be rapidly read, reviewed or searched. Vast archives of important data that might otherwise remain inaccessible are available for instant review no matter where you are. This e-book format makes a great reference work and educational tool. There is no other reference book that is as convenient, comprehensive, thoroughly researched, and portable - everything you need to know, from renowned experts you trust. For over a quarter of a century, our news, educational, technical, scientific, and medical publications have made unique and valuable references accessible to all people. Our e-books put knowledge at your fingertips, and an expert in your pocket!
THE HUMAN FACTOR
Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980
John A. Pitts
The NASA History Series * Scientific and Technical Information Branch * National Aeronautics and Space Administration * Washington, D.C., 1985
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Chapter 1. Medicine, Machines, and Manned Flight
Chapter 2. The Human Factors of Project Mercury
Chapter 3. NASA's Life Sciences Program
Chapter 4. The Human Factor in Long-Duration Manned Spaceflight
Chapter 5. Life Sciences Management in an Accelerated Space Program
Chapter 6. The Biopolitics of Manned Spaceflight
Chapter 7. Lunar Trajectories: Biomedicine in the Gemini and Apollo Programs
Chapter 8. Directing the Life Sciences Program
Chapter 9. A New Bioastronautics Crisis
Chapter 11. Toward an Integrated Life Sciences Program
Chapter 12. NASA Life Sciences from the Shuttle into the Future
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Preface
Americans hailed the first manned lunar landing as an unprecedented technological achievement, a triumph of American ingenuity, inventiveness, and enterprise, and a symbol of the nation's return to world technological preeminence. This praise for American technology obscured a fundamental reality: that man, not the machine, was the critical variable in manned spaceflight and that a major responsibility for controlling this variable lay not only with engineers and mission planners, but with life scientists as well.
In 1958, the year in which Congress established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the human factor (the necessity for considering human well-being, health, safety, performance, and behavior as major constraints in engineering and mission planning) was the major concern for manned operations in space. The human factor injected into an otherwise purely engineering undertaking an array of variables that were, at the time, neither predictable nor easily specified. In a number of significant areas, normative values for predicting human physiological and behavioral responses to the conditions of spaceflight and the space environment and for providing specifications for the design and engineering of life support, protection, communications, and control systems were either nonexistent or of questionable validity.
Clinicians and biomedical scientists could not predict the limits of human tolerance to the actual and potential hazards of spaceflight. These hazards included "stress factors" of spaceflight (multiple G and impact forces, noise and vibration, isolation and confinement, alterations in day-night cycle, abrupt changes in demands on circulatory and respiratory systems), effects of exposure to a closed environment (artificial atmosphere, toxic contaminants, fuel leakage, humidity and thermal extremes), and hazards of the natural environment of space (weightlessness, radiation, thermal extremes, oxygen deprivation). The future of manned spaceflight hinged on the ability of biomedical scientists to identify limits of human tolerance to these environmental and operational factors.
Identification of tolerance limits was considered essential not only for the qualification of man for spaceflight, but also for engineering and mission planning. Engineers required precise information on human physiological and behavioral requirements in order to design and engineer space systems that would protect human passengers against these expected hazards, provide for effective monitoring of critical physiological functions, and, through proper placement and arrangement of communications, control, and display equipment, assure effective human performance. Precise human factor specifications were needed in order to avoid unnecessary weight (a major concern because of launch propulsion limitations) and unnecessary complexity. Mission planners also required exacting biomedical specifications in order to define mission profiles, establish mission durations, integrate biomedical monitoring into the overall mission, and provide for safe and efficient recovery operations for man (and machine). In short, the human factor created a need for active consideration of biomedical factors and active participation of life scientists in planning, evaluating, and implementing research, development, and operations in support of manned spaceflight.
Given the human factor, those charged with responsibility for planning the American manned space program recognized from the outset the need for a multi-disciplinary approach to technical and operational decision making and for close and continuous interaction among life scientists, physical scientists, engineers, and mission planners. This had a direct bearing on space program organization and management. Recognizing the importance of biomedicine to the initial manned effort, NASA's first Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, established a biomedical group as an adjunct to the Space Task Group, which had technical and operational responsibility for Project Mercury, and created a special, high-level advisory group of leading human factors specialists to advise NASA on biomedical requirements for the manned space program. Later, as the scope of the space program expanded and as NASA began to plan for manned programs beyond Mercury, Glennan's successor, James E. Webb, saw a need to expand and diversify the agency's life sciences programs to meet the requirements of an expanded, diversified, and accelerated manned (and bioscience) space program.
Webb authorized a form of organization and management for the life sciences that turned out to be a source of enduring internal conflict and external controversy throughout the manned space program. He and his subordinates viewed the life sciences as activities that should be supportive of and subordinate to the agency's major space programs (space sciences, advanced research and technology, manned spaceflight operations). They favored a form of organization which aligned clinical medicine with the manned spaceflight program office, medical and human factor research with the advanced research and technology program office, and space biology ('biosciences") with the space sciences and applications program. This arrangement, in management's view, would encourage multi-disciplinary coordination in areas where coordination was essential, while at the same time ensuring effective alignment of the elements of the life sciences programs with the respective major program offices. NASA's top management, which included no life scientists, made nominal provision for coordination among these three life sciences components. No direct effort was made to integrate the life sciences into a single office or to appoint a life scientist to a high-level administrative position. In the view of Webb and his top administrators, NASA had a critical need for life sciences support of its major space programs, but did not have a need for a major program in the life sciences.
This approach to the organization and management of the life sciences was logical, given the agency's major responsibilities in space and its obligation to achieve major manned spaceflight objectives in the most expeditious, efficient, and economical way. Nonetheless, this arrangement generated internal conflict and controversy and gave rise to a unique term, "biopolitics." Biopolitics refers to competition for life sciences funds, resources, and program authorities and occurred at several levels: among the three NASA life sciences offices, between NASA managers and public spokesmen for the scientific community, and between NASA and the U.S. Air Force.
Internally this arrangement and personalities combined to foster divisiveness among the agency's three life sciences offices. Dominated by physical scientists and engineers, NASA's top administrators believed that the life sciences could be compartmentalized along the same lines as the physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering, when in fact the biological sciences, behavioral sciences, medical sciences, and clinical medicine are to some degree interdependent and often had areas of overlap Dividing and compartmentalizing life sciences management resulted in little active and regular interaction and cooperation among biologists' medical scientists, and clinicians (generally a normal activity in biomedical settings). In the process, management inadvertently invited factionalism and jurisdictional disputes associated with competition for funds, resources, and authority. The effective subordination of the life sciences to engineering and the physical sciences retarded the growth and development of a viable program of fundamental research in biomedicine and of an effective and integrated life sciences program, and discouraged life scientists outside NASA from actively supporting and participating in the manned space program.
Many articulate and influential scientists were hostile to the manned space program and viewed NASA's arrangements for the organization and management of its life sciences programs as justification for their hostility. These scientists, who viewed manned spaceflight as an unnecessary and unjustified investment of funds and a reckless and unnecessary risk of human life, favored a space program oriented toward scientific research in space rather than manned space exploration. They believed that the manned program used funds that could be better spent on unmanned space missions. Thus they looked upon NASA's arrangements for the life sciences as evidence of the agency's insensitivity to scientific research. The life sciences, they felt, could not make important contributions to scientific knowledge as long as they were decentralized, subordinated to physical science, engineering, and operational programs, and devoid of representation at the highest administrative levels. The subordination and decentralization of the life sciences, combined with the mission orientation of NASA, would, in their view, preclude the interaction among biologists, medical scientists, and clinicians that is normal in biomedical research settings, discourage the development of a program of fundamental biomedical research, and encourage the use of man as an experimental animal. Given these concerns, many scientists questioned NASA's ability to provide adequate biomedical support for manned spaceflight.
NASA's top management was repeatedly urged to free its life sciences programs from subordination to engineering and mission operations. Critics stressed the need for increased emphasis on fundamental research and a more traditional approach to the qualification of man for spaceflight (particularly, animal research as a preliminary condition of manned flights). Toward these ends, they recommended that NASA create a centralized life sciences research facility, an integrated life sciences program office, and a high-level life sciences administrative position.
External criticism of NASA's life sciences programs continued throughout the manned space program and resulted in several congressional investigations. Except when pressed by Congress, NASA's top administrators tended not to respond to the hue and cry from the scientific community. An integrated life sciences program, in management's view, was inconsistent with the agency's major responsibilities in space. Implementation of these recommendations, management believed, would necessitate a major increase in the space program budget and a major realignment of program responsibilities which could retard the pace of the manned program. NASA suspected that its critics among scientists wanted the agency to function as if it were a scientific research organization, comparable to the National Institutes of Health, rather than a mission agency charged with conducting manned and unmanned operations in space for scientific and technological development. With a mandate to place a man on the Moon before 1970 and to develop the nation's capabilities for manned operations in space, NASA could not afford, from management's perspective, the leisurely pace and autonomous structure of a scientific research organization.
NASA also, in the early 1960s, was not in a political position to build up its life sciences research capabilities and its life sciences program to the level required to satisfy these scientists. A major expansion of in-house capabilities in the life sciences ran directly counter to the aspirations of the Air Force. Air Force interest in manned spaceflight began in the late 1940s. By 1958, it had oversight responsibility for all space-related research and development within the Department of Defense and was well ahead of NASA and the other military services in planning for manned space operations. More important, the Air Force had pioneered in the field of aerospace medicine, had conducted or sponsored most of the extant research into the human factors aspects of high-altitude flight and spaceflight, was the nation's major employer of specialists in space medicine and biotechnology, and had facilities for research and development in aerospace medicine and biotechnology unmatched by any other government or private agency. As late as 1965, the Air Force was still the nation's leader in aerospace medical research and development and the training of specialists in aerospace medicine.
Given its own aspirations in space, the critical importance of biomedicine to manned spaceflight, and its unchallenged leadership in space medicine, the Air Force did not favor an expanded life sciences program within NASA. While Air Force officials had no objection to an increase in NASA's capabilities in space biology, they adamantly opposed any NASA buildup in biomedicine and biotechnology. Both political and practical factors underlay this opposition. Politically, Air Force officials feared that any reduction in its biomedical capabilities would justify a reduction in support for an Air Force manned space program. In practical terms, the Air Force feared that a major biomedical program within NASA would preclude full utilization of existing Air Force aeromedical research, development, and training facilities, make it difficult for the Air Force to attract specialists in aerospace medicine and biotechnology, and deprive the Air Force's aerospace physicians of the opportunity to gain experience m manned space operations. Accordingly, the Air Force and its supporters in Congress strove to deny NASA the funds and authority to strengthen its in-house biomedical capabilities at the same time that life scientists outside NASA were demanding that NASA increase these capabilities.
The history of the biomedical aspects of the manned space program is thus a multifaceted one. One facet is the technical and operational decision making that underlay biomedical research, development, and operations in support of the manned space program. What were the biomedical requirements and objectives at each stage of the manned space program? How, and by whom, were these requirements and objectives identified and ranked? What was the nature of the research and development projects undertaken to fulfill these requirements and achieve these objectives? How successful were the biomedical preparations for, and what were the biomedical results of, each of the manned programs? What role did the separate life sciences programs (space biology, human factors research, biotechnology, and space medicine) have in supporting the technical and operational objectives of the manned space program?
The history of biomedicine during the manned space program is also a history of administrative decision making. How did the technical and operational requirements of the manned space program affect the organization and administration of NASA's life sciences programs? What factors underlay management decisions concerning the allocations of life sciences resources, personnel, and authorities? What arrangements did management make to encourage coordination and timely resolution of jurisdictional disputes among the decentralized life sciences programs? What were the major organizational and management problems that emerged within the life sciences programs, and how were these problems resolved? What factors led NASA's top administrators, on several occasions, to make changes in the organization and management of the agency's life sciences programs?
The history of the biomedical aspects of the manned space program is also a study of biopolitics, that is, the effect of political factors on life sciences within the space program. What were the political considerations that influenced decision making in the space life sciences? To what extent, if at all, did these factors influence technical, operational, organizational, and management decisions? How successful were NASA's opponents and critics in influencing congressional decisions related to NASA's life sciences programs?
This historical analysis of biomedicine during the manned space program considers all these questions. The technical and operational problems that NASA's life scientists faced as they strove to provide biomedical support for both approved and advanced manned programs are discussed, as well as the administrative and political problems that emerged as NASA's life sciences programs expanded and diversified to meet the requirements of an accelerated space program. Together, the narrative and analysis illuminate the important contributions of NASA's life scientists to the nation's achievements in space, and record the difficulties and frustrations these scientists experienced as they tried to create a viable, integrated, and effective program in the space life sciences.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Medicine, machines, and manned flight
The American manned spaceflight program officially began in November 1958, when the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) received authorization to launch a man into Earth orbit. That effort, Project Mercury, was the first phase of a program that would lead to a series of manned lunar landings between 1969 and 1972 and the Skylab missions of 1973-1974, which qualified man for space missions lasting up to 84 days. Between Mercury (which included animal flights before single manned flights) and Apollo, the Gemini and Skylab projects successfully launched and recovered two and three men, respectively. The Skylab missions of 1973 and 1974 exposed men to a spaceflight duration of 84 days. That the space program moved so far so quickly is a testament to NASA's ability to harness and coordinate a diversity of talents and resources. It also testifies to the nation's capabilities in biomedicine and the behavioral sciences and to NASA's ability to encourage and sustain a working relationship among biomedical and behavioral scientists, clinicians, physical scientists, engineers, and mission planners.
This working relationship, though unusual, was not unprecedented. Within the military services, life scientists, engineers, and mission planners were accustomed to close interaction. For more than 50 years before the first manned spaceflight, these diverse specialists had worked together to solve human factors problems in aeronautics, to identify and measure human limitations at increasingly higher altitudes and speeds, and to develop equipment that would enable man to transcend these apparent limitations. Those charged with planning for Project Mercury and the Subsequent phases of the manned space program were products of this experience.
MEDICINE AND MANNED FLIGHT BEFORE 1958
A new phase in human exploration began on November 21, 1783, when two Frenchmen rose over the French countryside in a balloon1. Their flight introduced men to an era in which exploration would be inextricably bound to the machinery of exploration and to man's ability to cope with the conditions of unusual, and increasingly hostile, environments. Given the role of medicine in extending the frontiers of flight, it was fitting that one of the two persons on that first balloon flight was a physician. Numerous physicians flew on subsequent balloon flights. An American, John Jeffries, made several balloon flights after 1784 and may have been the first to investigate the effects of flight on man. He recorded a significant decrease in temperature, oxygen, and pressure with altitude and described a painful sensation in his ears. A contemporary, British surgeon John Shelton, discovered that nausea and irrational behavior can be effects of flight. Neither Jeffries nor Shelton understood the connection between diminished oxygen supply and diminished barometric pressure and the observed physiological effects.2
The manner in which Jeffries and Shelton investigated the conditions and environment of flight-using themselves as test subjects-became a tradition that continued into the period of powered flight. Steadily increasing speeds and altitudes and maneuvering capability raised new questions concerning human physiology and performance, and these questions naturally attracted the attention of flight-oriented physicians. These physicians, most of whom were military flight surgeons, generally were not research scientists, but more pragmatic, mission-oriented investigators. They sought to understand the factors that affected the health and performance of flight crews and to identify methods for reducing or eliminating ill effects.
Flight physicians often took heroic approaches to their investigations of the human factors problems of flight, using themselves as test subjects. Col. Randolph Lovelace gave a dramatic demonstration of this approach in 1943. Lovelace hypothesized that the decreased density of the atmosphere at high altitudes would intensify the shock of parachute opening during emergency escapes. To test this hypothesis and evaluate several items of equipment intended to minimize the shock, he bailed out at an altitude of 12,195 meters. He proved his hypothesis and the value of the backup equipment: the shock nearly killed him, but the equipment saved his life.3 Other flight physicians have made comparable heroic efforts. In most cases, their objective was to identify the causes of, and develop preventive measures against, specific problems, while developing a scientific understanding of the physiological and behavioral dynamics associated with flight operations.
Biomedical interest in flight was not entirely limited to flight surgeons, however In the 1860s, French physiologist Paul Bert began to investigate systematically the physiological effects of diminished oxygen and barometric pressure. He realized that he needed to be able to simulate, on the ground, the flight environment. Accordingly, he constructed the world's first pressure chamber, in which he could simulate altitudes up to 10,980 meters. Using himself and dogs as experimental subjects, he conducted 670 experiments in which the percentage of oxygen in the air was constant and barometric pressure was the variable. He discovered that heart and respiration rates and digestive gases vary in direct proportion to altitude. Above 4,880 meters, he experienced nausea and dimming of vision. These symptoms of altitude sickness disappeared when he breathed air enriched with oxygen.
Bert followed these investigations with inflight research on two occasions. Two of his associates, both scientists, ascended to 7,991 meters in a gondola that was equipped with bags of oxygen having special mouthpieces. Both flights confirmed his belief that the use of oxygen-enriched air above 1,840 meters would eliminate the effects of altitude sickness. These experiments nearly ended in disaster, however, because Bert did not realize that the passengers would have to breathe oxygen continuously above the critical altitude.4
Bert had correctly identified the need for supplementary oxygen at high altitudes, but he failed to recognize that the critical factor was not the quantity of oxygen available, but the oxygen saturation within the blood, which in turn was a function of atmospheric pressure. Several European physiologists discovered this factor during balloon flights between 1900 and 1903. Their work led to conclusions that became part of the theoretical framework of aerospace medicine: man cannot survive above 7,930 meters without extra oxygen; oxygen must be force-fed through a closed mask in order to ensure optimum blood saturation; and man requires protection within a sealed structure or pressure suit at altitudes above 12,200 meters. 5
The advent of powered flight and its rapid development after World War I augmented biomedical interest in the human factors of flight. Increased speeds and variable accelerations associated with maneuvering drew attention to the effects of these factors on physiology and performance, while developments in the machinery of flight raised concern over the possible clinical effects of noise, vibration, and toxic fumes. These and other factors gave increasing impetus to research in biotechnology-the application of information derived from human research to the development of life support and protective equipment to improve human performance in flight operations.6 During the interwar period, aviation medicine came under the nearly exclusive control of the military services.
Research, development, and training facilities established by the Army and Navy remained the primary centers for aviation and space biomedicine through the mid-1960s. The activities at these facilities reflected the developing interaction among biomedical and engineering personnel and a pragmatic approach to aerospace medicine.7
The development of jet aircraft following World War II, like the advent of powered flight 30 years earlier, generated renewed interest in human factors. The jet age placed new emphasis on the identification of human capabilities and limitations, the design of systems and equipment to maximize these capabilities and minimize the limitations, and the definition of standards for selecting and training the individuals best qualified to endure the stresses and hazards of high-speed, high-altitude flight.8 The development of jet flight strengthened and sustained the traditions of biomedical involvement in manned flight and mission-oriented biomedicine that had slowly emerged with propeller-powered flight.
While flight-oriented physicians and biomedical scientists gave primary attention to the human factors problems of aeronautics during the postwar period, interest in human factors aspects of spaceflight grew steadily during the 1950s. A cadre of German specialists in rocketry, biotechnology, and aviation medicine were the primary force behind this growing attention to space biomedicine. Between 1946 and 1948, the Army transferred 34 of these specialists to American military facilities, a few to Navy facilities.9
The dean and principal theoretician of the group was Hubertus Strughold, a physician and physiologist who had been engaged in aviation medical research since the mid-1920s. A Rockefeller Foundation Fellow, he gained international stature as a professor of aviation medicine and as director of the German Aeromedical Research Institute.10 Strughold established the world's first department of space medicine at the Air Force School of Aviation Medicine in 1950. Under his leadership, the school became a major center for basic and clinical investigations into the physiological and behavioral effects of spaceflight and the space environment. During the 1950s, researchers at the school conducted (or sponsored) investigations into the biodynamics of spaceflight (physiological effects of stress factors and weightlessness), human performance (psychological, psychophysiological, and neurological effects), and metabolic, psychological, and other human requirements in space. The results of these investigations were regularly communicated to scientists worldwide through publications and symposia. 11
Strughold contended that the distinction between space and atmosphere was artificial and misleading, at least as far as human biology was concerned. He maintained that man begins to experience "space equivalent" conditions at an altitude of 15,250 meters, where he is exposed to most of the hazards of the space environment and cannot survive unless protected by a sealed capsule or a pressure suit. For this reason, he argued, manned spaceflight is a natural extension of aeronautical flight, and space medicine a logical extension of aviation medicine. Biomedical investigations into the human factors of spaceflight, he concluded, must build on and extend knowledge already gained from aviation medicine.12 Strughold's views had both practical and political value. They encouraged confidence in the nation's fundamental capability for proceeding with manned spaceflight, and they provided a rationale that Air Force officials would later use to justify the claim that the Air Force should direct manned spaceflight.
A number of other German scientists, particularly Otto Gauer and Henning von Gierke, were assigned to the Aviation (later Aerospace) Medical Laboratory at the Wright Air Development Center. Since the 1930s, this center had sponsored research into human physiological requirements in flight and had applied the results to the design and engineering of pressurized cabins, pressure suits, protective equipment (couches, restraints, cushions), and life support equipment (for example, oxygen masks for high-altitude flights).13
Like Strughold at the School of Aviation Medicine, Gauer and his associates introduced a theoretical approach to aerospace medicine at the Wright facility. Gauer theorized that multiple G acceleration followed by weightlessness could have serious physiological effects. He observed that the acceleration forces encountered during spaceflight launch and reentry would depress circulatory function and cause certain conditions that had been observed in high-altitude aeronautical flights: pooling of blood in the extremities and the brain ("redout") or insufficiency of blood supply to the brain (blackout). Weightlessness, he theorized, would compound the problem since, in the absence of gravity, the blood vessels would relax and would not perform the capillary action that normally aids the heart in the circulation of blood. Consequently, the heart, already overtaxed by multiple G acceleration, would be further strained by the loss of capillary action. This combination of factors, he believed, could lead to conditions such as heart failure, pneumonia (from pooling of blood and fluid in lungs), or severe muscle cramps (from pooling of blood in muscles). He suggested that this combination of factors could also disrupt the normal processes of the nervous system, through which the brain sends signals to the body systems in response to sensations. Because the sensations derive from pressure exerted at various points on the body, the multiple G and null G states, and their rapid succession, could cause the brain to receive and send mixed or conflicting signals. This, in Gauer's view, would affect balance, spatial orientation, and the body's efforts to compensate for circulatory dysfunction.14
In practical terms, Gauer's theories implied that these effects could he negated, or at least significantly reduced, if some means could he found to reduce the multiple G forces experienced during launch. Following this suggestion, researchers at the Wright center conducted tests of the relationship between body position and the physiological effects of G forces. After numerous tests with a centrifuge between 1952 and 1957, researchers concluded that maximum physiological tolerance results when the forces are applied transversely perpendicular to the head-to-foot axis.15
The Wright center was also responsible for designing equipment that would protect pilots of high-altitude, high-speed aircraft. This responsibility later included space crews, who would face similar, but more extreme, hazards. The major protective devices developed were pressure suits, couch and restraint systems, emergency escape hatches and seats, enclosed flight cabins, and life support equipment. By the end of the 1950s, scientists and engineers at Wright had become increasingly interested in the modification and redesign of aeronautical equipment for spaceflight.16